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Abstract 
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determinants of the optimal proportion of long-term investment and hence, we characterize the role of bank as 
financial intermediary. Third, our model is characterized by the existence of multiple steady states equilibrium with 
threshold effect that impedes the economy to reach a long-run higher steady state equilibrium. Furthermore, we show 
that financial intermediary is better than financial market, in order to reduce threshold effect and to ensure the long-run 
steady state equilibrium of capital stock.
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1. Introduction 
 During the last two decades, studies on the finance-growth nexus have 
emerged, but the findings are still currently subject to relevant debate1. In the context 
of developing countries, financial development is often associated with banking sector 
development, since financial market is relatively underdeveloped. However, at the 
end of 1990s, the growing importance of stock markets in both developing and 
developed countries has again opened a new avenue of research into the relationship 
between financial and growth, which focuses on the effects of stock market 
development. Using time-series data collected from five developed economies, 
Arestis et al (2001) examine the relationship between stock market development and 
economic growth. In particular, their results support the view that banks are more 
powerful than stock market to promote economic growth. In a similar vein, Rioja and 
Valev (2004) have found that in the countries with very low levels of financial 
development, additional improvements in financial markets have an uncertain effect 
on growth.  
In spite of the importance of banking sector to promote economic growth, the 
literature also suggests that the role of financial market can not be neglected. Levine 
and Servos (1998) show that stock market liquidity leads to faster rate of growth, 
productivity improvement, and capital accumulation in both developed and 
developing countries. Levine (1991) and Bencivenga et al (1995) argue that stock 
market liquidity facilitates long-term investment, since investors can easily sell their 
stake in the project if they need liquidity before their project matures. Enhanced 
liquidity and long-term investment, therefore, increase higher-return projects that 
boost productivity growth.  
  In the meantime, it is also well accepted that financial market tends to suffer 
from asymmetric information and thus, financial liberalization fostering stock market 
liquidity is often blamed for macroeconomic downturn, as well as banking 
vulnerability and crisis (Bhide, 1993; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detagriache, 1999). This 
argument supports the presence of banks as delegated monitor to reduce information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers (Diamond, 1984).  
Recently, both empirical and theoretical studies have further questioned the 
positive link between financial development and economic growth. In the empirical 
literature, Deidda and Fattouh (2002) report that there is no significant impact of 
financial development on economic growth in low-income countries, although in 
high-income countries, there is a positive link between financial development and 
economic growth. Mihci (2006) also highlights that the relationship between finance 
and growth is not necessarily positive when substantial variations across different 
periods and country groups are taken into account. Meslier-Crouzille et al (2011) 
further indicate the presence of threshold effect on the link between rural bank 
development and regional growth in the Philippines.  
In the theoretical literature, Deidda and Fattouh (2002) theoretically show a 
non-linear relationship between financial intermediation and endogenous growth. The 
effect of financial intermediation on economic growth remains ambiguous at low 
initial levels of banking sector development. This is because risk-averse agents always 
prefer to incur financial transaction costs even though the expected return on their 
                                                 
1
 In empirical study, see King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine (1998), and Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) for the country-level study; Fisman and Love (2002) for the industry-level study; or Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) for the firm-level study. In theoretical study, see Bencivenga and Smith 
(1991), or recently Hung and Cothren (2002). Levine (2005) provides a comprehensive literature 
review. 
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savings is lower than under financial autarky. Such condition holds because financial 
intermediation can fully perform in risk diversification process. As a result, the 
economic growth rate under banking sector is lower than under financial autarky. At 
high levels of the banking sector development, the relationship between banking 
sector development and economic growth is always positive, where the level of 
banking sector development depends on the initial level of real per capita income.  
Moreover, Aghion et al (2004) and Caballé et al (2006) also develop models 
where instability occurs at intermediate levels of financial development and, thus, 
these models provide support to the evidence that emerging markets are quite 
vulnerable. Similarly, Townsend and Ueda (2006) propose a coherent unified 
approach to the study of the linkages among economic growth, financial structure, and 
inequality. In particular, their model displays transitional growth with financial 
deepening and increasing inequality. 
 With regards to the particular role of banking as financial intermediary, most 
of theoretical models depart from the contribution of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on 
the liquidity provision function of banks. Through this channel, banks exist to 
mobilize agents’ savings into more profitable long-term investments. Under this 
framework, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) are the first to show that financial 
intermediary is better than financial autarky (financial market) in order to spur 
productive long-term (illiquid) investments rather than short-term (liquid) venture. 
Consequently, higher long-term investments enhance economic growth. However, the 
optimal portion of long-term investment in Bencivenga and Smith (1991) is 
decreasing in the income of long-term investment, although it is increasing in the 
fraction of entrepreneurs. Hence, although the income of long-term investment is 
higher than that of short-term ventures, it does not always provide incentives for 
agents to be entrepreneur. When incentives matter, their model needs to consider the 
presence of asymmetric information and agency conflicts. Moreover, it is also 
irrelevant that the optimal portion of long-term investment under the financial 
intermediary equilibrium is increasing in the income of short-term ventures.  
As Bencivenga and Smith (1991) is one of the major literatures on financial 
intermediation, the aim of this paper is thus to reevaluate their finance-growth nexus. 
We modify several hypotheses used by Bencivenga and Smith (1991). First, since our 
motivation is to set up an appropriate model for developing countries, we consider 
that externalities changes due to technological innovation may be less likely to play a 
significant role in boosting economic growth. Thus, we use the Neo-classical growth 
hypothesis without externalities in an overlapping generation (OLG) model with three 
periods instead of drawing endogenous growth model, as used by Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991), or Deidda and Fattouh (2002). Second, we distinguish the behaviour 
vis-à-vis of risk between non-entrepreneur and entrepreneur. More precisely, 
entrepreneurs are supposed to be risk neutral2. This hypothesis allows us to consider 
that entrepreneurs’ behaviour may be the source of costly overinvestment which 
reduces long-term economic growth. Likewise, Baumol (1990) emphasizes that 
entrepreneurship activity may be unproductive or even destructive. In this regard, 
entrepreneurial activities can be riskier than the non-entrepreneurial activities. 
Using these stylized facts, our contribution is threefold. First, we show that 
entrepreneurship is always growth enhancing in both financial intermediary 
equilibrium and financial market equilibrium3. Second, we acknowledge that agents’ 
                                                 
2
 Azariadis and Smith (1998) also use such hypothesis for a different framework of model. 
3
 The optimal portion of long-term investment is increasing in the fraction of entrepreneurs, the income 
of long-term investment, and the agent’s savings rate. 
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saving is a determinant of the optimal proportion of long-term investment, where in 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), financial intermediary does not consider agents’ saving 
as input and thus, it is somehow irrelevant. In our model, we characterize the 
traditional role of bank as financial intermediary (deposits and investments). Third, 
our model is characterized by the existence of multiple steady states equilibrium with 
threshold effect. In this regard, financial intermediary is better than financial market, 
as the threshold level of financial intermediary equilibrium is lower than that of 
financial market equilibrium. As well, financial intermediary yields a higher transition 
of capital stock than financial autarky.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model 
set-up. Section 3 constructs the financial market equilibrium. Section 4 lays out the 
financial intermediary equilibrium. Section 5 compares the dynamic path of capital 
stock and threshold effect under both financial market and financial intermediary. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The Set-Up 
  The framework we use is one of overlapping generations (OLG) model with 
three periods and a unique good. As in Bencivenga and Smith (1991), we also 
consider a bank without liquidity risk that invests more efficiently by pooling all 
economic resources. On the contrary, we modify two aspects in the Bencivenga-
Smith’s economy. First, we assume that the entrepreneurs are risk neutral following 
Azariadis and Smith (1998). Second, we consider the existence of a technology in 
developing countries but without the types of externality considered by Romer (1986). 
  We assume that there is no population growth in the economy and each 
generation consists of a continuum of agents with size NN t = . Each agent may live 
for two or three periods. Let t be the time index, where the young and middle-age 
generations are endowed with an initial per firm capital stock of 0k  units at t = 0 and 
1k  units at t = 1, respectively. Moreover, each young agent supplies inelastically one 
unit of labour in the first period. 
  In the first period, all agents of a generation are identical. At the beginning of 
the second period, the agents learn whether they will be either non-entrepreneurs 
(two-period-lived agents) or entrepreneurs (three-period-lived agents) with 
probability )1( pi−  and pi , respectively. Thus, there are N)1( pi−  agents who will be 
non-entrepreneur in the second period and Npi  agents who will be entrepreneur in the 
third period. All young agents save entirely their labour income in the first period.  
  Non-entrepreneurs consume their second-period incomes, tc1 , while 
entrepreneurs only consume the profit of production realized in the third period, tc2 .  
Thus, agents have different liquidity needs in which non-entrepreneurs have higher 
liquidity need than entrepreneurs, since non-entrepreneurs only live for two periods. 
Meanwhile, the young agents have incentive to be entrepreneur if the profit of long-
term investment is relatively higher than the return of non-entrepreneurs’ saving.  
  As entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, we can define the agent’s preferences at 
time t by the following expected utility function. 
 ( ) tttt ccccU 2121 )1(),( piφγ
pi γ +
−
−
=
−
, where 00 =tc .                           (1) 
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We define itc  as the period i consumption of an agent who is born at time t. The 
constant relative risk aversion is denoted by 1−>γ . The variable φ  stands for the 
individual specific random variable realized at the beginning of period 2. Thus, the 
value of φ   is equal to 0 with probability pi−1 , or 1 with probabilitypi .  
 To build a link between saving and economic growth, we characterize the 
production function in the third period. Specifically, the entrepreneur’s production ty  
is realized by physical capital tk  and units of labour tL . In this regard, we follow the 
Cobb-Douglas production function as following 
θθ −
=
1
ttt LAky  .                    (2) 
where [ ]1,0∈θ  is the part of production that uses tk  and A is an arbitrary coefficient. 
For simplification, we assume that capital depreciates completely at the end of period. 
Furthermore, there is no endowment of capital at period 0>t  except for the initial 
young generation and middle-age generation. For entrepreneurs (the old generation), 
they do not need endowment, as they already have resources to realize production that 
generates profit.  
 The entrepreneur’s profit tΠ  is the difference between the production and the 
cost of quantity units of labour defined as ttttttt LwLAkLk −=Π
−θθ 1),( . On the 
equilibrium of labour market, labour demand tL  is equal to labour supply, NN t = , 
which is obtained by maximizing the entrepreneur’s profit subject to tL . Thus, we 
have ( ) (1 )t t tw w k A k θ θθ pi= = −  and the maximized profit function at each period t as 
much as  
 
θθψ tt kA=Π , with 11 −− == θθ piψ tL .                     (3) 
 
3. The Financial Market Equilibrium 
  This system refers to an economy without the presence of bank as financial 
intermediary. In the first period, the agents divide their savings ts  between liquid and 
illiquid assets. Liquid assets are considered as the inventory of consumption goods. 
One unit invested in liquid asset at t directly yields 0>n  units of consumption goods 
at both 1+t  and 2+t . On the other hand, one unit invested in illiquid asset yields R 
units of capital goods only at t+2. If illiquid asset is liquidated at t+1, then the agents 
receive the “scrap value” of x units of consumption goods, where nx <<0 .  
  In order to establish the agents’ budget constraint, we define mtz  and 
m
tq  as 
the proportion of liquid asset and illiquid asset invested at t, respectively. The 
superscript m stands for financial market. Hence, we have 
  1=+ mt
m
t qz , where 0,0 ≥≥
m
t
m
t qz .                    (4) 
In the first period, the agents’ saving is equal to labour income, tt ws = , and is 
divided into t
m
t sz  units of liquid asset and t
m
t sq  units of illiquid asset. Let SILL iii ,, be 
the interest rate of liquid asset, illiquid asset, and “scrap” value of illiquid asset, 
respectively. In the second period, let t1ω  be the income of non-entrepreneurs after 
one period, where 
   t
m
t
m
tt wxqzn )(1 +=ω  ; Lin += 1  and )1( six +=                               (5) 
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On the contrary, by hypothesis, entrepreneurs’ consumption at the second period is 
zero.  
  At the beginning of the third period, entrepreneurs sell their illiquid assets and 
reinvest them in physical capital, so that 2)1( +=+ ttmtIL ksqi . This situation 
corresponds to the financial autarky case, as entrepreneurs sell their illiquid assets by 
themselves. Let t2ω  be the income received by entrepreneurs after selling out their 
illiquid assets, but before the production is realized. Specifically, we have 
t
m
tt
m
tt wqRwzn +=2ω ,  where ILiR +=1 , Rnx <<<0 ,             (6.a) 
and, 
 2
m
t t tk Rq w+ = .                                                                   (6.b) 
Note that in the third period (t+2), entrepreneurs will use their income of illiquid 
investment to finance physical capital and use it for production. Hence, we have 
2+= tt
m
t kwRq  as defined in (6.b).  
Using the profit function in (3) and the budget constraints in (4), (5) and (6.b), 
the agents’ expected utility function, whatever their types, is as follows   
( )tmttmttmttmtmt nwqwRqAwqnwxqqU )1()()1(()1()( −++





−+
−−
=
−
θ
γ
θψpi
γ
pi
.        
Meanwhile, the agents’ optimization program is defined as { })(maxarg
00
m
t
q
qU
m
t ≤≤
. 
From the first order condition, we obtain the optimal proportion of illiquid asset ( mtq ) 
as follows. 
 ( )
( )( )
( )
1
1
( ) tm mt t
t
B wnq q w
n x w n x
γ− −
= = −
− −
                 (7) 
where ( ) ( ) 




−
−
−
≡
xnw
wARnw
wB
t
tt
t
ψθ
pi
pi θθ 2
1
.    
 The optimal proportion of illiquid investment mtq  depends on the labour 
income tw . In Bencivenga and Smith (1991), mtq  is constant. Moreover, the existence 
of mtq  in which 10 ≤≤
m
tq  can be examined by the limit value of 
m
tq  when 
+→ 0tw  
and +∞→tw .  
From (7), it is straightforward to obtain −∞=
+→
m
t
w
q
t 0
lim  and 1lim =
+
∞→
m
t
w
q
t
, since 
tt nwwAR >ψθθθ 2  . Hence, there is a value of tw which implies that 0=mtq . We use 
(6.a), (6-b), (7) and the first order condition for maximal profit to construct the 
dynamics of capital stock. The dynamics of capital stock is defined as follows  
 2 ( ) ( ) ( )mt t t m tk Rq k w k kφ+ = ≡                                                                            (8) 
In other words, we have an equation that describes the evolution of the capital stock 
over time. 
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4. The Financial Intermediary Equilibrium 
  In this section, we consider the presence of banks as financial intermediary 
that decides agent’s financial decisions. We assume that bank is a coalition of young 
agents who can be either non-entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs.  Let btz  and 
b
tq  be the 
proportion of liquid and illiquid investment realized by banks, respectively. Thus, we 
have 
 1=+ bt
b
t qz .                     (9) 
Bank ensures non-entrepreneurs to receive btR1  units of consumption goods at t+1 
from each unit invested at t, where 
 xqnzR bt
b
tt
b
t 211)1( ααpi +=−                  (10) 
t1α  and t2α  are the part of liquid and illiquid asset liquidated at the second period, 
respectively. Bank then chooses the values of t1α  and t2α . On the other hand, bank 
also ensures entrepreneurs to receive btR2  units of capital goods at t+2 from each unit 
of time t illiquid investment and btR2
~
 units of time t+1 consumption goods from each 
unit liquid asset invested at t. For the withdrawal after two periods, there are 
pi entrepreneurs who must receive btR2  units of capital goods from each unit of illiquid 
investment. Thus, btR2pi  factor must be equal to the rest of illiquid asset )1( 2tα−  
multiplied by the income of investment btqR . Thus, bank must provide capital goods 
for entrepreneurs as much as 
b
tt
b
t qRR )1( 22 αpi −=                   (11) 
In addition, entrepreneurs must receive btR2
~
 units of consumption goods for each unit 
of liquid investment at t. The constraint btR2
~
pi  must be equal to the rest of consumption 
goods ( t11 α− ) multiplied by nz bt . Thus, bank must provide consumption goods for 
entrepreneurs as much as 
 nzR btt
b
t )1(
~
12 αpi −=                   (12) 
In the next step, we define the program of financial intermediary for both non-
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs. First, if there are )1( pi− non-entrepreneurs who will 
liquidate their investment at t+1, bank must hold t
b
t wR1  units of consumption goods to 
be distributed at t+1. Second, as there are also pi  entrepreneurs who will liquidate 
their investment at the beginning of t+2, bank must hold t
b
t wR2  units of capital goods 
and t
b
t wR2
~
 units of consumption goods to be distributed at t+2.  
Using budget constraints (10), (11), and (12) we define the expected utility of 
financial intermediary in the following relation 
 )~)(()()1(),( 22121 tbttbttbttt wRwRAwRccU ++
−−
=
− θγ θψpi
γ
pi
                  (13) 
To simplify (13), we assume that bank should only provide liquidity at t+1, since none 
of the capital assets is liquidated “prematurely”. As well, bank should meet the 
following liquidity constraint 
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 nRA >θψ                    (14) 
By this assumption, we can reduce some variables as follows. In the third period 
(t+2), bank will only consider the existence of pi entrepreneur. As a matter of fact, 
entrepreneurs realize the production in order to get the profit. Thus, their profit should 
be superior to all income of liquid investment. Such condition provides incentive for 
agents to become entrepreneur. In other words, nRA >θψ , and  
 ( )( ) ( )( )tbttbtt wqnwqRA pipiαθψ //)1( 2 >−             (15.a) 
Equation (15.b) is fulfilled if and only if bank set 
 02 =tα .                (15.b) 
Meanwhile, bank also maximizes the expected utility of non-entrepreneurs. Hence, 
bank will reallocate non-entrepreneur’s illiquid assets into liquid assets at the 
beginning of t+1. For realizing this strategy, bank will set 
 11 =tα                  (15.c) 
Using (15.b) and (15.c), we simplify (10), (11) and (12) respectively to become 
n
z
R
b
tb
t
pi−
=
11
,                   (16) 
b
t
b
t q
RR
pi
=2 ,                   (17) 
0~2 =
b
tR .                   (18) 
Using (16), (17), and (18), and the budget constraint (9) we establish the program of 
financial intermediary as follows  
 
















+






−
−−−
=
− θγ
pi
θψpi
piγ
pi t
b
t
t
b
tb
t
wRq
Anw
q
qU
1
1)1()( .                   
Hence, bank will choose btq  to maximize )( btqU . From the first-order condition, we 
obtain the optimal proportion of illiquid asset ( btq ) as follows 
 
( )( ) 111(1 )( ) 1 tb bt t
t
B w
q q w
nw
γpi − −−
= = − ,               (19) 
where ( )
1 1 2
1
t
t
A R wB w
n
θ θ θpi θ ψ− −
≡ .  
Combining (11) and (19), we obtain  
 
( ) ( )
2 ( )
b
t t
t b t
R q k w k
k kφ
pi+
= ≡ .                     (20) 
This equation describes the relationship between the current and the future capital 
stock.  
From (19), we also notice that the optimal portion of long-term investment 
( btq ) is decreasing in the income of short-term ventures. This situation is relevant, 
since higher income from short-term ventures should positively affect short-term 
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investments. As short-term investments increase, long-term investments decrease 
following (9). This condition does not hold in Bencivenga and Smith (1991).  
 
5. Capital Stock Accumulation and Threshold Effect 
  In comparing the level of steady state equilibrium of capital stock under the 
financial market and financial intermediary model, we specify Proposition 1 and 2 as 
follows.  
 
Proposition 1 
For 0=x  we show that the optimal value of illiquid investment under financial 
intermediary is higher than the optimal value of illiquid investment under financial 
market.  In other words, we have mt
b
t qq > .   
 
Proof:  
From (7) and (19), we show that ( ) ( ) tt nwBnwB γγpi −−−− <− 1
1
1
1
1)1( . Thus, we 
examine whether BB <1 . From 1B  and B , we only examine if 
<














−
−− γ
θ
θ
ψθ
pi
pipi
1
1
2)1( tw
RA
γθθ ψθ
pi
pi −−






−
−
1
1
2 )(
1 tt
nwwAR .          (21.a) 
Equation (21.a) can be rewritten as 
 
γ
θ
pi
pipi θθ
θγ
γ −−






−<− −−
1
1
2
1)1(
t
t
wAR
wn
               (21.b) 
For 1−>γ  the inequality is verified if the left hand side is less than one, while the 
right hand side is greater than one. By definition the value of the left hand side is less 
than one. For the right hand side, we proceed as follows 
 
1
1
2 2
2 1 .
t
t t t
t
nw AR w AR w nw
AR w
γ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
pi
pi θ pi θ pi
θ
+
 
− < ⇔ < + 
 
 Since 1<θpi , we 
verify that 22 θpiθ θθθθθ tt wARwAR < .  As discussed above, Proposition 1 is laid down 
for 0=x . This condition can be interpreted as the best case in which financial market 
is efficient, since there is no premature liquidation to fulfill the liquidity needs of two-
period-lived agents (non-entrepreneurs). Proposition 1 explicitly shows that although 
the financial market is at the best condition, the illiquid investment of the financial 
market equilibrium is always lower than that of the financial intermediary 
equilibrium. To illustrate Proposition 1, we perform a numerical simulation by taking 
10=R , 4.0=pi , 75.0=θ , 100=γ , 5.0=n , 0=x , and 1=A  in which the condition 
nRA >θψ  is fulfilled. Figure 1 shows that the optimal illiquid investment of the 
financial intermediary equilibrium is higher than that of the financial market 
equilibrium.   
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Figure 1. The Illiquid Investment in the Financial Market and  
Financial Intermediary Equilibrium 
 
From Proposition 1, we further lay out Proposition 2 as a consequence of Proposition 
1. 
 
Proposition 2 
The existence of banks enhances economic growth more significantly than the 
absence of banks. 
 
Proof:   
In the financial intermediary equilibrium, economic growth is determined by the value 
of )(2 tbt kk ϕ=+ . Meanwhile, in the financial market equilibrium, economic growth is 
determined by the value of of )(2 tmt kk ϕ=+ . From Proposition 1, it is straightforward 
to find mb µµ > , where 
t
tb
b k
k )(ϕµ =  and 
t
tm
m k
k )(ϕµ =  are the change of capital stock 
in the financial intermediary and financial market equilibrium, respectively.  
Proposition 2 is thus proved.  
 From (8) and (14), we illustrate the dynamics of capital accumulation in each 
case as follows.  
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Figure 2. The Dynamic Path of Capital Stock 
 
In Figure 2, we observe the existence of threshold effects at the stationary states *bk  
and *mk  for the financial intermediary and financial market equilibriums, respectively. 
Threshold effect is defined as follows 
 
Definition 1. Threshold effect is a low level equilibrium trap or local 
underdevelopment trap when initial capital stock is very low, so that both financial 
intermediary and financial market can not enhance long-term economic growth.  
 
From Figure (1), we observe that there are three stationary states in both the financial 
intermediary and financial market equilibrium: (i) the trivial steady state at 0=k , (ii) 
the low level equilibrium trap ( *k ), and (iii) the high level steady state equilibrium 
( **k ). Moreover, we observe that the financial intermediary system is more accurate 
than the financial market model to reduce the threshold effect. We verify this property 
in Proposition 3.  
 
Proposition 3 
In the financial intermediary and financial market equilibrium, the economy 
converges to higher long-term steady state equilibrium, if initial capital stock exceeds 
a threshold level. Moreover, the threshold level under financial intermediary is lower 
than the one under financial market.  
 
Proof: 
To prove Proposition 3, we verify the existence of threshold effect in both the 
financial intermediary and financial market equilibriums.  
 
(i) The financial intermediary equilibrium 
 
At the stationary states, we have )(kk bϕ= . However, it is difficult to solve 
algebraically the stationary capital stock (k ). From Figure (1) we observe that 
tt kk =+2
 
 
  
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)(kk bϕ=  has two roots *bk  and **bk . Alternatively, we derive )( tb kϕ in order to 
obtain the first-order condition as follows 
( ) 













 Ω
+++−
+





 Ω
+−
−=
+
+
−
γθθ
γ
γpipi
γpi
θθϕ 1
1
1
1
)1(1
1
)1()(
n
nAk
nk
n
R
kd
kd
t
tt
tb
          (22.a) 
where 
γ
θθθ
θ
ψθθpipi
pi
+
−
+−








+−−





≡Ω
1
1
21 ))1(( tAk
R
n
A
. 
To show the existence of threshold effect *bk , we examine if there is tk in which 
1)( >
t
tb
kd
kd ϕ
. In other words, 01)( >−
t
tb
kd
kd ϕ
 and )( tb kϕ  intersects tt kk =+2  at *bk  
as shown at Figure 2. In order to simplify (22.a), we assume that 1→pi  and hence, 
1→ψ . Under this condition, we simply obtain  
 
t
tt
t
tb
k
RkAk
kd
kd θθϕ θ
pi
)1(1)(lim
1
−+
−=−
→
.            (22.b) 
Despite assuming that 1→pi , we do not change the properties of the financial 
intermediary equilibrium. Since our purpose is to formalize the role of financial 
intermediary in enhancing entrepreneurship through long-term investment, the 
absence of non-entrepreneurs does not affect the change in capital stock. This is 
because economic growth should not be relied on non-entrepreneurs but 
entrepreneurs. From (22.b), we examine if there is tk  in which the right hand side of 
equation becomes positive. In other words, 
 



	
A

B

C
D






−
>∧∞<=⇔
>
−+
−
−1
1
)1(
1
0)1(
θ
θ
θθ
θθ
RA
kkkS
k
RkAk
ttt
t
tt
                 (23) 
Since 0, >RA  and 10 << θ , then 0)1(
1 1
1
>





−
−θ
θθRA
 and we obtain
 
1
1
*
)1(
1 −






−
=
θ
θθRA
kb                   (24) 
Equation (24) is simply defined as the threshold level of the financial intermediary 
system, because for each 0k  where +∞<< 0
* kkb , we have 1
)(
>
t
tb
kd
kd ϕ
.  
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 (ii) The financial market equilibrium 
 
Following the case of the financial intermediary system, we assume that 1→pi  and 
consequently, 1→ψ . By solving the first-order condition for )( tm kϕ  and its limit 
for 1→pi , we obtain 
 1)1(1)(lim
1
1
−
−
−
=−
−
→ xn
RnkA
kd
kd t
t
tm θθϕ θ
pi
               (25) 
The threshold effect *mk  exists, if and only if there is 0>tk  in which 1
)(
>
t
tm
kd
kd ϕ
 or 
01)( >−
t
tm
kd
kd ϕ
 . From (25), we have  
 
1
1
2
*
−






−
−
−
=
θθθ
xn
AnR
xn
AnRkm                  (26) 
Since 10 << θ , then it is straightforward to denote that 0* >mk . Hence, the existence 
of threshold effect in the financial market system is acknowledged. 
 
(iii). Financial intermediary vs. financial market 
From (24) and (26), we now verify if the threshold level under financial intermediary 
is lower than the one under financial market. For this purpose, we need to show if 
 
θθ
θθ )1(
1)1(
−
<−
− RAxn
AnR
                 (27) 
As 1→θ , the left-hand side converges to 0, but the right hand side converges to 
infinity. Meanwhile, as 0→θ , the left hand side converges to 0, and the right hand 
side converges to 1. By these results, Proposition 3 is proved.   
  
 Threshold effects in the finance-growth nexus is one of our contributions in 
this paper. This finding is particularly important in developing countries, where 
banking sector is relatively more important than financial market to enhance 
economic growth. For instance, let 0k  be an initial capital stock that lies below the 
threshold level of financial market ( *mk ) as shown in Figure 1. In order to reach the 
long-run steady state equilibrium of capital stock, 0k  should be iterated by the 
)( tb kϕ curve. In turn, this mechanism can drive the economy to converge to **bk . 
Conversely, if 0k  is iterated by the )( tm kϕ curve, the economy may disappear because 
the steady state equilibrium of capital stock converges to zero. In this case, we denote 
that financial intermediary is better than financial market in order to ensure the 
existence and uniqueness of long-run steady state capital stock, and to reduce 
threshold effect. Hence, long-term economic growth can be well achieved as 
productive investments emerge and short-term ventures decline. By extension, the 
potential sources of speculation from short-term ventures can be reduced.  
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 However, if the initial capital stock is too low, as it lies below the threshold 
level of financial intermediary ( *0 bkk < ), the steady state equilibrium of capital stock 
can approach to zero, even if financial intermediary exists. In such a case, there is no 
positive link between financial development and economic growth in developing 
countries. On the other hand, if developing countries have sufficient initial capital 
stock, then the introduction of banking system ensures the economy to converge to 
higher long-run steady state equilibrium.  
   
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we reevaluate the finance-growth nexus à la Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991). Our stylized feature is twofold. First, in modelling the finance-growth 
nexus, we use the Neo-classical growth framework instead of drawing endogenous 
growth as developed by Bencivenga and Smith (1991). Second, we distinguish the 
behaviour vis-à-vis of risk between non-entrepreneur and entrepreneur, as both agents 
have different liquidity needs.  
By these features, we provide three original contributions in this paper. First, 
we show that entrepreneurship is always a growth-enhancing factor in both financial 
market and financial intermediary equilibriums. Second, we characterize the role of 
bank as financial intermediary in the process of savings and investments. Third, we 
show that financial intermediary is better than financial market in order to ensure the 
existence and uniqueness of the long-run steady state equilibrium of capital stock. 
Thus, financial intermediary is better than financial market in enhancing long-run 
economic growth. In this regard as well, we highlight that although threshold effect 
exists in the finance-growth nexus, the presence of banks as financial intermediary 
reduces such threshold effect. Threshold effect is important in the finance-growth 
nexus, since it shows the difficulty of developing countries to raise initial capital 
stocks. This situation may in turn impede production, physical capital accumulation 
and hence, long-run economic growth. Accordingly, threshold effect should be 
acknowledged in the future research in the finance-growth nexus, notably in 
developing countries, where externalities due to human capital and technological 
innovations are not yet well-developed.  
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